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Tahrir Square or Taksim Square, Gezi Park, Zucotti Park or Pearl Roundabout: all these urban 
landmarks have become reference 
points for the waves of demonstrations, 
uprisings and protests which have 
shaken regimes, stirred hitherto 
complacent elites and opened up 
prospects for change, sometimes 
superficial, often transformative.  How 
do we understand this singularity 
which led Time magazine to declare 
‘The Protestor’ the person of the year 
for 2011? Are there underlying forces 
common to all of them? 
Writers have been struggling to get 
to grips with these various movements, 
some giving up the attempt at a 
common explanation, suggesting it 
is too early to do so. Perry Anderson 
reached back to the 1810 to 1825 
Wars of Liberation in Latin America, 
the European Revolutions of 1848-49 
and the unravelling of the Soviet bloc 
from 1989 to 1991 to describe the Arab 
Uprisings of 2011 as a “concatenation 
of political upheavals, one detonating 
the other, across an entire region 
of the world”.1 alain Badiou took a 
similar broad historical view, seeing 
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the various uprisings around the world 
as a moment marking the rebirth of 
History, with the riots trying to stop the 
post-1980 re-assertion of imperialism 
and the rebirth of the only Idea capable 
of halting capitalism, namely the Idea 
of Communism.2 Manuel Castells 
reached back to his Communication 
Power (2009) for his 2012 analysis of 
the various social movements which 
had erupted across the globe, arguing 
that there was a ‘deliberate attempt 
to change power relationships…
by reprogramming networks around 
alternative interests and values, and/or 
disrupting the dominant switches while 
switching networks of resistance and 
social change’.3
In recalling the Arab uprisings or 
the Occupy Wall Street movement, 
there may be a tendency to forget how 
widespread the mass actions were. It 
is estimated that just the occupying 
movements touched millions of people 
in about 950 cities in 82 countries. This 
does not even include the Icelandic, 
Brazilian, Turkish or Chinese protests 
let alone the many in South Africa, the 
latter being dubbed ‘social delivery 
protests’.
This essay argues that there are two 
paradigms under which the different 
countries need to be examined: 
• Civic protests: this took various 
forms, including the riots, such as 
those in London and Paris, and 
which has seen violent reaction 
from the state in some cases. 
Citizens were using space that was 
being created by the expansion of 
democratic rights.
• Pro-democracy movements:  again 
largely peaceful in origin, many of 
these movements have had to resort 
to some form of violence in pressing 
for democratic rights from repressive 
or authoritarian, undemocratic 
regimes. 
In countries like Iceland, Tunisia, 
China, Brazil, South africa, the Occupy 
Wall Street movements, protests could 
be explained by the first paradigm 
where a multi-class movement is 
able to push for demands being met 
through open, peaceful mass action. 
Syria of 2011 falls under this paradigm, 
whereas the situation has morphed to 
such an extent that it now falls into the 
latter category. Egypt of 2013, where 
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emboldened sections of the population 
have been staging pro- and anti-regime 
demonstrations, is very much like what 
has become the hallmark of Thailand’s 
politics.
Bahrain, Yemen, Iran in 2009, Egypt 
in 2011 fall under the latter where the 
exceedingly brave, unarmed masses 
took on  well-armed repressive regimes, 
some of which had not hesitated in 
using violence to suppress opposition. 
Egypt is an example of a country which, 
with the removal of Mubarak in 2011 
fell under the latter category and then 
having opened the political space, was 
able to manifest the first paradigm in 
achieving the removal of Morsi in June 
2013, albeit in a manner which smacks 
of a coup. As the 29 June 2013 editorial 
of The Economist notes, in trying to 
explain the various demonstrations, 
and especially their multi-class nature: 
“In the emerging economies rapid 
real growth has led people to expect 
continuing improvements in their 
standard of living”. 
asef Bayat recalls the 1989 
formulation of Timothy Garten Ash 
to suggest that what we are seeing in 
the case of Egypt, Yemen and Tunisia 
is ‘refolutions’ i.e. ‘revolutions that 
push for reforms in, and through, 
the institutions of the existing power 
regimes’. Bayat reminded us recently 
that most pathways of change follow 
the same familiar route: reform, 
insurrection, or implosion. In most 
cases movements work within state 
institutions, putting pressure on it to 
reform. The insurrection path requires 
a revolutionary movement. Examples 
of these include the Iranian Revolution 
of 1979 and that of Libya, with NATO 
help, in 2011. Regime implosion is 
often the result of mass upheavals with 
new elites taking over hurriedly e.g. 
Romania in 1989.
The jury is still out on whether there 
is a unifying logic to the two paradigms 
but I am willing to argue that when 
looked at it in broad societal terms the 
following could form the bedrock of 
the various movements:
• Frustration with material and non-
material deprivations. 
• Growing identity across similarly 
minded sectors of society.
• Realisation of the power of new 
communication technologies to 
organise and mobilise. 
Analysts have alleged that the 
uprisings were spontaneous and 
unexpected, that they have been 
leaderless movements and largely as a 
result of the power of social media. The 
essay examines these three allegations 
and then concludes with what is to be 
expected over the next few years.
The Arab world: surprise! Surprise?
The successful call of the Occupy 
Wall Street movement, and its rapid 
spread to other centres, took many 
by surprise, including the magazine 
Adbusters which issued the original 
call to occupy.  Similarly, the impact of 
the self-immolation of a street vendor 
in Tunisia and the flame he lit across 
the Arab region took many by surprise. 
Likewise the London Riots, the Brazilian 
marches, and the protests in India 
took usually well-informed analysts by 
surprise. The surprise elements may be 
due to blinkered views, which have 
blinded some to the arc of resistance 
that communities and entire peoples 
have been expressing over the past 
few decades. Commentators have 
also noted the multiclass nature of the 
protests, where huge sections of the 
middle class are involved.
The Arab world cannot be seen as 
a passive, backward world which was 
waiting to be ignited by Mohammed 
Bouazizi, the Tunisian street vendor. 
as anderson points out, “Below the 
commotion now shaking the Arab 
world have been volcanic social 
pressures: polarisation of incomes, 
rising food prices, lack of dwellings, 
massive unemployment of educated – 
and uneducated – youth…In few other 
regions is the underlying crisis of society 
so acute, nor the lack of any credible 
model for development, capable of 
integrating new generations, so plain”.4
The Arab world has been undergoing 
many 'dress rehearsals' for the uprisings 
which occurred during 2011 and 2012. 
To cite a few examples:
• In Sudan in 1985 an uprising of 
students, workers and professional 
ended President Numeiri's 
military-led government;
• In Egypt in 1992 local leaders 
with an Islamist agenda took over 
Imbaba, the poor urban quarters 
in Cairo. The area was subjected 
to a military siege before eventually 
relenting.
• The Palestinian Intifada of 1987 to 
1993 saw a widespread solidarity 
movement emerge in many parts of 
the Arab world.
• In 2003 it is estimated that about a 
million people marched in Yemen 
to protest the invasion of Iraq by the 
United States.
• The Lebanese 'Cedar Revolution' of 
2005 saw the active mobilisation 
of 1.5m people, leading to the 
withdrawal of Syrian troops from 
Lebanon.
• around the same time the Kifaya 
(Enough!) movement saw large 
scale, multi-class, multi-sectoral 
mobilisation which asef Bayat 
described as 'post-national and 
post-ideological'.
• In april 2008 there was the Egyptian 
April 7 Movement, largely a youth-
based movement, using the Internet 
and Facebook as its main tools 
of communication. It came out 
in support of the striking textile 
workers, achieving a general strike 
which lasted several days.
It is no wonder that Rami Khouri, 
editor-at-large of the Beirut-based 
Daily Star, has banned the use of 
the word 'Spring' to describe the 
uprisings saying that it gives the idea 
of awakening after winter's slumber. It 
also makes it sound like an ephemeral 
moment. He describes the lumping 
together of all the uprisings under the 
banner 'Arab Spring' as 'some subtle 
Orientalism at work.5 There is no doubt 
that the developments of the past few 
years represent an important shake-up 
in the foundations of sovereignty and 
power structures in the respective 
countries. They also have important 
implications for the constituting of 
national identities. Observers have 
indicated that the success of the 
Egyptian and Tunisian cases may be 
due to them being largely homogenous 
societies, a factor which accounted 
for the early stirrings of nationalism in 
these countries in the 19th and 20th 
centuries.
On the other hand the protracted 
and divisive nature of the Syrian 
situation bears testimony to its colonial 
legacy where disparate people 
were thrown into a country whose 
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boundaries were drawn between the 
French and British according to the 
infamous Sykes-Picot Agreement. 
The Syrian regime’s reforms opened 
up the space for the civic protests to 
take place. However, the involvement 
of a variety of powers has put a halt 
to the reforms. The make-up of the 
opposition, ranging from secularists to 
Salafist agendas makes the outcome 
of this conflict a highly uncertain one. 
It can go in the direction of Tunisia or 
follow the route of Egypt.
In the aftermath of the success of 
Tunisia's Islamist Al Nahda Party and 
the Egyptian parliamentary election, 
which was won spectacularly by 
the combined forces of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the Salafists, several 
issues were thrust onto the agenda. The 
primary one was the kind of society 
that Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia, or 
for that matter in Libya and Yemen, 
envisaged for their countries. 
The Muslim Brotherhood, having 
ridden the tiger of the Tahrir Square 
movement to its own benefit, came 
to power through the slenderest of 
margins. It then proceeded to squander 
a huge opportunity through the heavy-
handedness of the Morsi government. 
As Adam Shatz points out, while 
Muhammad Morsi wanted to see 
himself as an Egyptian Erdogan, he 
antagonised just about every sector of 
society, even the Salafists to his right.6 
The Tamarrod, a youth movement 
even broader than that which 
occupied Tahrir Square, collected a 
petition of 20 million signatures, urging 
Morsi to resign. On the other hand the 
Al Nahda, under the wise leadership 
of Rashid al Gannouchi, has taken a 
much more pragmatic approach trying 
to bridge the gap between the Salafists 
and the secularists, while trying to 
deepen democracy.
Multi-class spontaneity 
Commentators have also 
commented not only on the seeming 
spontaneity of the protests but also 
on the seeming irony of the middle 
classes of Brazil taking to the streets in 
the manner they have. Commenting 
on these protests, Vincent Bevins in 
his blog on 13 August 2013 argued: 
“Just because they happened doesn’t 
mean they were waiting to happen, 
or that they had to happen based on 
political/economic circumstances”.7 
Peter Hakim wrote: “No one saw 
the protests coming. No one seemed 
to have had an inkling of the depth 
of anger and frustration of ordinary 
Brazilians…Even the organisers of 
the initial demonstrations, who were 
responding to a six percent rise in 
bus fares, were stunned by the huge 
numbers that joined them”.8
Vincent Bevins argues of the Brazil 
case: “There is no such thing as ‘the 
protesters’. … People have dropped 
out, come back in, become disgusted 
with new elements; the focus has 
moved between cities, then returned, 
and marches have varied vastly in 
size and tactics and have stood for a 
very large number of different political 
causes, some contradicting the other 
ones”.9
The Turkish establishment was 
also taken by surprise by the ferocity 
of the protests they had to deal with. 
What began as a campaign to save 
a grove of sycamores in Gezi Park, 
close to the famous Taksim Square, 
quickly spread to a protest against 
Prime Minister Erdogan’s authoritarian 
rule. As Dani Rodrik, who has familial 
connections with Turkey, wrote: “This 
is not a struggle between secularists 
and Islamists…It is abuse of power, by 
Mr Erdogan’s government, straight and 
simple, that unites the protestors”.10 He 
reminds us that nearly half the electorate 
did not vote for the moderately Islamist 
Justice and Development (aK) Party in 
the June 2011 elections. It is important 
to note that the Turkish uprisings were 
also multiclass, multi-faith occurrences 
with the majority of the participants 
being young people.  Erdogan tried 
casting aspersions on this motley 
crowd, describing them as alcoholics. A 
tweeter replied that if drinking alcohol 
makes you an alcoholic, then being in 
power makes you a dictator. 
Whilst countries in Asia have not 
occupied the headlines in quite the 
same manner as the cases cited above, 
there have been many instances 
of social movements involving 
large masses of people. India saw 
mass protests against the gang rape 
and killing of a student in Delhi in 
December 2012. Also, largely middle-
class protestors took to the streets to 
join Anna Hazare’s campaigns against 
corruption in India. Organised through 
the aam aadmi (Common Man), it 
has mobilised millions. In Vietnam, Le 
Quoc Binh has been organising ‘flash 
mobs’ of young people dressed in 
similar attire, to promote the cause of 
lesbian and gay rights. 
One can end this section of looking 
at the issue of the surprise around the 
manifestations actually occurring and 
their multi-class nature by concluding 
tentatively that given the worsening 
economic and political conditions 
people have been facing on a daily 
basis, there was a degree of certainty 
about them occurring. Their rapid 
spread and the involvement of a 
variety of sectors was a real surprise, 
especially for those in the left used 
to notions of the proletariat or the 
peasantry taking direct action. The 
preponderance of the middle class 
could possibly be explained by the 
resources they have at hand in terms of 
time and money. Also they tend to feel 
the pinch of corruption more directly. 
Most importantly is that they have the 
skills – be it legal, financial, medical, 
organisational etc.
Action without leadership
Another charge directed at the global 
uprisings is that they lacked leadership 
or clear demands or that iconography 
and slogans played a more important 
role than content. Slavoj Zizek said that 
only these political happenings, without 
hegemonic organisations, charismatic 
leaderships, or party apparatuses could 
create the ‘magic of Tahrir’, while Alain 
Badiou has called this the ‘communism 
of movement’. Commentators have 
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pointed to the ubiquitous presence 
of the Guy Fawkes masks in the OWS 
and Turkey demonstrations, making 
them the symbol of these modern day 
revolutions. The roots of this symbol 
lay in the anti-government character 
‘V’ of a graphic novel from the 1980s. 
What is clear from the various 
manifestations is that in many parts of 
the world people depend much less 
on organised formations such as trade 
unions, civic organisations or even 
political parties to take their causes 
forward. In places like Tunisia trade 
unions, professional associations and 
political parties played a crucial role in 
providing leadership to the protests. 
Perry Anderson has described the 
mass demonstrations by unarmed 
citizens as the “lance of the uprisings”. 
Furthermore, as Partha Chatterjee 
has argued “Modern statecraft 
cannot resolve 'the very real tensions’ 
which are apparent in the political 
life of every postcolonial nationalist 
regime in the world”. The social 
movements which are thus spawned 
reject capitalism for its “association 
with modernism and the West and 
preaching either a cultural revival or 
a utopian millennialism”.11 Holston, 
on the basis of experiences in Brazil, 
proposes the concept of insurgent 
urban citizenship, where residents of 
a city turn into active citizens “that 
confront entrenched national regimes 
of citizen inequality”.
David Graeber, a key organiser of 
the OWS, argues that their movement 
had no option but to work outside 
the prevailing system. He suggests 
that only when they stepped outside 
the traditional path, “rejected the 
existing political order entirely as 
inherently corrupt…that occupations 
immediately began to blossom across 
the country”.12 Martin Sandbu argues 
that in an ironic twist of the strategies 
available to resisters – between voice 
or exit – the OWS chose to “turn voice 
into a means of exit”.  
This allows us to widen the lens 
of discussion a little more. Chatterjee 
uses the concept of ‘political society’ to 
refer to a realm which is independent 
of civil society – he sees civil society 
as part of the liberal democratic order 
used by capital to maintain hegemony. 
In ‘political society’ the subaltern 
makes claims on the state for rights 
and benefits which are being enjoyed 
by more privileged sectors of society. 
This should open up discussions 
about the position of large swathes 
of marginalised people in our society 
such as migrants, the unemployed, 
women – especially as people at the 
receiving end of daily assaults.
 asef Bayat, even before the arab 
Uprisings, wrote of ‘non-movements’ 
of masses of people. He pointed out 
that non-movements are built on the 
day to day experience of thousands 
upon thousands of individuals. Hence 
the youth develop/forge collective 
identities in public spaces such as 
cafes, colleges, schools etc. but 
linked to one another passively and 
spontaneously. He also analyses such 
movements amongst women and 
other categories. Non-movements, 
according to him, are action-oriented, 
seek redress through direct actions 
(unlike organs of civil society which use 
protest); their actions are merged into 
routines of society such as selling goods 
where the law does not allow it, or just 
channelling electricity illegally etc.
Fabio Malini spoke of a project 
which had been monitoring the topics 
being tweeted in Brazil, using the 
hashtags as proxy for the issues being 
communicated around. He points out 
that the data showed a “dynamic of 
territorialisation of these movements. 
In other words, the movement in 
São Paulo became one thing, while 
the movements in Vitória, Recife, 
and Salvador emerged in different 
ways... In our analysis of millions of 
tweets in late June and early July, 
the most common hashtag used was 
#protestoRJ [protestRJ]. It’s interesting 
that this hashtag became the diagnosis 
of the political crisis in Brazil, which 
moved from São Paulo to Rio”.13
Striking a contrarian note to Malini 
is Peter Hakim’s view that “while 
presenting a long list of grievances, the 
Brazilian marchers offered no concrete 
prescriptions and made few specific 
demands... The New York Times 
reported that when one young female 
protestor was asked about her aims, 
she said, ‘we want it all, and we want 
it now’”.14 Paula Daibert pointed out 
that “a survey carried out by Al Jazeera 
found that Brazilians have broader 
demands apart from local grievances 
such as the proposed hike in bus 
fares”.15 Putting an end to government 
corruption was the most visible demand 
of demonstrators, followed by calls for 
more transparency in public service 
spending; an end to police violence 
and a more participatory political 
system. At the same time, 77 percent of 
respondents said they strongly agree or 
agree that popular interests should be 
prioritised over economic ones related 
to World Cup and Olympics projects.
Mobilise, organise to educate, 
communicate
The third charge against the 
uprisings is that social media played a 
huge role in their success. On the side 
of the prosecution is no personage less 
than Turkish PM Erdogan who called 
social media “the greatest scourge to 
befall society”. 
There are many advantages to 
the use of social media. Malini, 
emphasising the role of social media 
in Brazil, pointed out that “Instead of 
spending hours watching TV, (people) 
spend more time in front of the 
computer or accessing the internet 
on their phones. …To be constantly 
connected to people discussing politics 
and criticising daily life in their city 
aids political change and in a way 
adds a new component to the media 
scene”. They can mobilise people 
quickly, even before the authorities 
can galvanise their troops to respond to 
protestors. Footages of protestors can 
also be distributed quickly, sending 
the message that, unlike what the 
state is claiming, the demonstrators 
are really ordinary people demanding 
things that everyone wants. Social 
media also provoke the established 
media into covering such issues. For 
example CNN’s Turkish affiliate aired a 
documentary on penguins at the height 
of the demonstrations. Social media 
photo-shopped that into depicting 
what the protestors were going through.
Social media has its down sides. 
Author of The Net Delusion Evegny 
Morozov has argued that the internet 
as a tool for liberation is limited, that 
the powers that be can just as easily use 
it to limit freedoms. Mobilising in this 
open way results in arbitrary gatherings, 
having a mix bag of demands. Footage 
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is very easily monitored by the police, 
especially through the use of face-
detection technology. Also, mobile 
phones have their own fingerprints, 
making it easy for the authorities to 
figure out who is in which areas. In 
response activists are developing their 
own counter tactics such as showing 
responsibility by filming protestors 
from behind or using a new tool on 
YouTube which allows them to blur 
faces.
A further downside David Runciman 
points out is that “Social networks have 
made it much easier for individuals to 
form shallow connections of shared 
concern and vicarious experience”.16 
He cites author Malcolm Gradwell 
who had argued that in the case of Iran 
social networking had played a limited 
role, declaring that “The revolution will 
not be tweeted”. His point is that the 
bystanders, and those following what’s 
trending on twitter, simply cannot 
have the experience of on the ground 
activists. 
Whither the uprisings?
To start looking at what the fortunes 
of these movements and uprisings will 
be let us conclude about the charges 
levelled against them:
• at the broadest level we should 
not be surprised at the lengths 
to which humanity is capable of 
going, the sacrifices it is willing to 
make to improve its lot and that 
of future generations. It is perhaps 
hubris surrounding what has been 
assumed to be neoliberal orthodoxy 
that led some to conclude that 
convulsions which shook up entire 
social orders were a thing of the 
past; that the dictators being 
propped up would serve the needs 
of imperialism forever. Hence the 
confusion in Washington when 
the Arab Spring broke out, and the 
often undemocratic postures taken 
by leading democracies of the West 
during subsequent developments.
• The multi-class nature of the protests 
is understood in terms of both the 
paradigms of social protests and 
pro-democracy movements. As 
for the former the middle classes, 
they have been stung into action by 
decades of abuse of power, be it in 
India, Brazil, Turkey or Tunisia. It 
required a high level of frustration 
for the middle class to become 
involved in assaults on the citadels 
of repressive regimes like that of 
Mubarak. 
• The charge of being leaderless 
is highly debatable. However in 
many parts of the world progressive 
organisations continue to uphold 
the flag for humanity while sadly in 
many other parts organisations have 
become part of the establishment. 
The shared experience and 
aspiration of so many millions 
did become very obvious, 
creating the possibility of a level 
of spontaneous coming together. 
What was required was a rallying 
call – whether it was a ‘Day of Rage’ 
or ‘Occupy!’. Social media did 
become a ‘collective organiser’ but 
not quite in the mould of Pravda. 
Rather it displayed the principles of 
‘democratic de-centralism’ where it 
served as the spinal cord of many 
tributaries of the nervous system, to 
cite Malini.
• This then brings us to role of social 
media. There can be no doubt that 
it played a huge role in the surprise 
element, in the multi-class nature 
of the protests and in the seeming 
absence of leaders. At the same 
time we need to recognise that it 
is not a discerning mobiliser, which 
worked for most of the movement 
because they wanted to mobilise 
people broadly against entire power 
edifices. also, as has been noted 
above, it is a double-edged sword 
which can be used by oppressor 
and protestor to equal effect. 
Lastly, we cannot count on the 
ephemeral connections of people 
to events through social media. As 
Gil Scot Heron proclaimed in ‘The 
Revolution Will Not Be Televised’:
The revolution will be no re-run 
brothers; 
The revolution will be live.
In looking at the way forward 
we could take for example Perry 
Anderson’s perspective that 
“Democracy…has become a common 
denominator of the various national 
movements”17.  However, the fact that 
many of the movements tended to 
avoid articulating clear demands and 
programmes creates its own problems. 
As Sandbu argued about the OWS: 
“The more the movement withdraws 
from actual politics into what it sees 
as a ‘liberated’ social sphere, the more 
difficulty it will have in playing such 
a role. It is not even clear that it can 
withdraw”.18
As far as the Arab world is 
concerned anderson argues that “The 
strategic priority for a re-emergent left 
in the Arab world must be to close the 
rift in the revolts by fighting for the 
forms of political freedom that will 
allow these social pressures to find 
optimal collective expression”. Peter 
Hakim has argued that “the protests 
should be viewed as an encouraging 
development for Brazil and leave one 
more optimistic about Brazil’s future… 
Brazil – a more robust and capable 
country today than it has been at any 
time in its history – is in a better position 
than ever to sustain its successes”.
An interesting feature alluded to in 
the opening of this essay is the manner 
in which the various demonstrations 
came to be associated with specific 
points in the urban landscape. While 
that should not delude us into thinking 
of them as localised uprisings, but 
just as the localised peasant uprisings 
of the 1800s in Europe and parts of 
Asia were harbingers of more broad, 
even nationalist transformations, we 
need to appreciate the current and 
recent uprisings in their global context. 
How deep the transformation will be 
remains to be seen. 
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